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I. INTRODUCTION

It has become nearly commonplace to say that the Supreme Court
under the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts is a court of
"incrementalism."l This Term's labor and employment decisions suggest
that the Court's conservative majority is willing in fact to be quite radical.
In a series of sharply divided decisions, the Court reshaped the law that
governs the workplace - or more specifically the law that governs whether
and how employees will be permitted access to the courts to litigate
workplace disputes. 2 At least as important as the Court's changes to the
substantive legal standards are the procedural hurdles the five justices in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Many thanks to Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Martin J. Katz, David Kaufman, Helen Norton, Louis Brands Savage, Charles
Sullivan and Kevin Traskos for their helpful feedback and conversation.
1. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2009, at Al, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/0lscotus.html?pagewanted=all>
(last viewed Nov. 10, 2009); Tony Mauro, Roberts Court Rakes NarrowRoad to Right, NAT'L L. J. July
6, 2009, available at <http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/legaltimes/PubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202431973734
&RobertsCourttakesnarrowroadto.right> (last viewed Nov. 23, 2009); Roberts Court Makes
Incremental Moves Toward More Conservative Legacy, Professors Say (remarks of panelists at
Supreme Court Roundup, Virginia Law Student Legal Forum, Sept. 11, 2009), noted at
<http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2009_- fall/scotus roundup.htm#> (last viewed Nov. 23, 2009).
2. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009). One of these cases - Iqbal - was not an employment case. Its likely impact on employment
litigation, however, warrants its inclusion in this list.
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the majority were willing to sidestep or ignore to reach their desired
outcomes. In two cases the Court ignored - and essentially overruled
long-settled precedent. 3 In another, the Court took upon itself the role of
fact-finder, resolving disputed facts in the underlying record as it applied a
newly minted legal standard to the case.4 And in a fourth, the Court
completed what was essentially a revision of the pleading rules, articulating
a standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 that imposes particular
burdens on plaintiffs - like those in employment discrimination disputes
whose claims include an element of intent.5 Together, these four opinions
demonstrate that the Court's current reputation for incrementalism - at
least in this important area of civil rights - is unwarranted.
Of course, the Court decided other labor and employment cases last
Term. 6 These other cases - some wins for employees and some for
employers - were fairly unsurprising, both in their outcomes and in their
analyses. In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,7 for
example, the Court held that a plaintiff may pursue a claim for retaliation
under Title VII if she is fired because of the responses she gives to
questions asked during an employer-initiated internal investigation of
another employee's sexual harassment allegation. 8 The Sixth Circuit had
concluded that an employee who was answering her employer's questions
was not in fact "opposing" sexual harassment. 9 The Court strongly rejected
that notion, explaining that:
3. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1475 (holding that collective bargaining agreement providing for
arbitral resolution of Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims is enforceable as a matter of law,
effectively overruling Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 416 U.S. 36 (1974)); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at
2350 (holding that mixed motive analysis is inapplicable to ADEA, effectively overruling PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
4. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678-81.
5. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-52.
6. The Court's 2008-09 labor docket was particularly focused on questions about the limitations
the First Amendment might apply to collection and use of union dues. In Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct.
798 (2009), the Court held that a local union can charge non-members for the costs of litigation
activities of its national affiliate even when the local will not benefit directly from the litigation. Id. at
802. The Court held that if the litigation being financed was of a sort that was chargeable to nonmembers (related to collective bargaining rather than political action) and if the national would readily
litigate on behalf of this particular local if similar need confronted it, then there is enough benefit
inuring to the local union from the national activity that charges to non-members will not violate their
rights. Id. at 807. In Ysursa v. PocatelloEducation Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009), the Court confronted
an Idaho statute that permitted union members to elect automatic payroll deduction of their regular
union dues, but banned automatic payroll deductions when the deductions would be used by the union's
political action committee. Id. at 1096. The Court concluded that the statute did not violate the First
Amendment because it was not a restriction on the union's speech but instead a decision not to promote
that speech. Id.
7. 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
8. Id. at 850.
9. Id. at 851.
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a person can "oppose" by responding to someone else's question just as
surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires
a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her
own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the
same words when her boss asks a question.lo

In AT&T v. Hulteen, the Court rejected claims by women who had
received or would receive lower pensions because of the way their
employer calculated seniority accrual during maternity leave before the
1978 passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)." The issue
arose because of the Supreme Court's 1976 holding in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII.1 2 The Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert was
contrary to the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and to every court of appeals to have considered the question, and
was legislatively overruled by Congress in the PDA.1 3 Because of Gilbert,
however, AT&T argued that it was not illegal sex discrimination to give
less seniority accrual for maternity leave than for other forms of leave prior
to 1978, when the PDA became law. Since the different treatment of
maternity leave at that time had not been illegal, calculating pensions today
using the leave accrued under the then-legal differential was similarly
legal. 14 The employees countered that the now-discredited Gilbert decision
should not be used to justify lower pensions for female retirees, and further
that the post-PDA calculation of their pensions to incorporate the old leave
penalty was itself a separate act of illegal discrimination, even if the leave
penalty was legal at the time.15 The Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Souter, sided with AT&T, concluding that because the employer's
pre-PDA disparate treatment of pregnancy leave did not violate the law at
the time it occurred, the company's pension plan was protected by Title
VII's special rule for "bona fide seniority-based pension plan[s]."l1 6 In
dissent, Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) argued in part that
treating AT&T's pension plan as "bona fide" under these circumstances
ignored the plain intent of Congress to discredit Gilbert and to make clear
that pregnancy should not be used to penalize women in matters such as

10. Id. The Court declined to consider whether Title VII's prohibition against retaliation for
"participation" in an investigation would also cover the challenged conduct. Id. at 853.
11. 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1968 (2009).
12. 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
13. See AT&T, 129 S. Ct. at 1974-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the state of the law at
the time the Supreme Court decided Gilbert).
14. Id. at 1968.
15. Id. at 1971-72.
16. Id. at 1968-69.
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calculation of pension benefits.' 7
These two relatively predictable decisions were the wallflowers in the
Court's 2008-09 employment cases. The cases likely to have broader and
more lasting impact - at least rhetorically - split the Court five to four and

involved overruling significant precedent and creating new legal standards.
I am going to discuss four cases here, exploring both the substantive rules
created by the majority decision, and also the procedural moves that led to
the decisions. The long term impact of these cases may or may not be
significant, depending on legislative responses and other possible
limitations on their ultimate scope. What is significant is what they reveal
about a Court willing to bend a few rules to get where it wants to go.
II. RICCI V. DESTEFANO

The employment case that received the most public attention this
Term was Ricci v. DeStefano, in which the Court found that the City of
New Haven had engaged in intentional discrimination against white
firefighters when it declined to certify the results of a promotion test that
had a disparate impact on minority firefighters.1 8 The Ricci decision is
certainly notable for a number of reasons. It was the first time the Court has
suggested that the disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions of
Title VII needed to be "reconciled." 9 In "reconciling" these two aspects of
the law, the Ricci majority significantly reinterpreted Title VII, borrowing
from Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence on affirmative action to create
a new statutory standard for defending against a novel type of
discrimination claim. The decision has generated a lot of work for lawyers
and human resource professionals who advise employers about diversity
and nondiscrimination in the workplace. But what is most significant about
the decision - and most likely to have long-term consequences - is the tone

of the four different opinions written in the case and what the Court's
language says about whether a majority of the Justices feel race
discrimination is a continuing problem and who they believe its victims
are. Also extraordinary is the majority's willingness to ignore its traditional
practice of giving lower courts an opportunity to apply new legal standards.
Instead of following settled procedure, the majority reviewed the evidence

17. Id. at 1976-77.
18. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
19. Id. at 2672. As the Court acknowledged, there were "few, if any, precedents in the courts of
appeals discussing the issue." Id. The absence of discussion in the lower courts is actually unsurprising
because the suggestion that efforts to comply with disparate impact would be acts of intentional
discrimination was novel.
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in the record below itself and not only reversed summary judgment for the
respondents but actually granted summary judgment for the petitioners.
The majority's decision to grant summary judgment to the petitioners
was a startling departure from the Court's usual practice. As Justice
Ginsburg noted in dissent, "[w]hen this Court formulates a new legal rule,
the ordinary course is to remand and allow the lower courts to apply the
rule in the first instance." 20 This usual approach allows the lower courts to
determine whether further factual development is needed to apply the new
rule. It permits the parties to the litigation to present arguments applying
the new standard - arguments that they could not have made before as the
standard did not exist. The Ricci majority was unwilling to allow these
normal litigation processes to play themselves out in this case or even to
explain why such an unusual course of action might have been appropriate
in this circumstance.2 1
At least as surprising as the Court's decision to apply its new rule to
the factual record is the way that it applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which sets the standards for summary judgment in federal courts. Rule
56 authorizes summary judgment where there is "no genuine issue as to
any material fact." 22 In Ricci, fully half of the lengthy majority decision
and dissent, and nearly all of Justice Alito's concurring opinion, were taken
up with setting out three very different versions of the facts presented in the
record.2 3 Of course, not all of the facts that fill these opinions are
necessarily material, but the vastly different perspectives offered in the
opinions show considerable dispute as to many of the facts material to the
legal questions the case presents.
The truly undisputed facts in Ricci are these: The City of New
Haven's fire department was required to comply with federal, state, and
local law in administering tests and selecting candidates for promotion to

20. Id. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. The highly critical - even suspicious - way that the majority described the Second Circuit's
handling of the case below, id. at 2672, may suggest that the Ricci majority simply didn't trust the lower
courts to come out the right way.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
23. The majority decision starts at 129 S. Ct. 2664 and continues to 129 S. Ct. 2681. Of these
seventeen pages, eleven (129 S. Ct. at 2665-72 and 2678-81) are taken up with a description of the facts
that the majority believed were relevant. Justice Ginsburg's twenty-one-page dissent, 129 S. Ct. at
2689-2710, similarly includes eleven pages of factual evaluation. See 129 S. Ct. at 2690-26, 2703-08
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Justice Alito explained that he wrote "separately only because the dissent,
while claiming that the Court's recitation of the facts leaves out important parts of the story, provides an
incomplete description of the events that led to New Haven's decision to reject the results of its exam."
129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal quotation and citation omitted). His six-page
concurring opinion (129 S. Ct. at 2683-89) was primarily occupied with setting out additional facts he
believed were material to the case. See 129 S. Ct. at 2684-88 (Alito, J., concurring).
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captain and lieutenant positions. 24 In 2003, the City administered a written
test as part of the process for selecting promotion-eligible employees for
these positions.2 5 The test was developed to account for 60 percent of the
promotion process because the City's contract with the union that
represented firefighters provided that promotion would be based 60 percent
on a written exam and 40 percent on an oral exam.26 The city charter
provided that, after the exam was administered, the Civil Service Board
(CSB) would rank a list of applicants, from which vacancies would be
filled. Candidates had to be chosen from among the top three scorers on the
list, and the list would remain valid for two years. 27 Seventy-seven
candidates completed the 2003 lieutenant examination and forty-one
28
candidates completed the examination for promotion to captain. For the
lieutenant position, thirty-four candidates passed the test. Twenty-five were
white, six black and three hispanic. The relative pass rates on the test were
58.1 percent for white test takers, 36.1 percent for black test takers and 20
percent for Hispanic test takers. 2 9 Given the City's system for filling
vacancies from among the top three scorers on an exam, the ten candidates
eligible for promotion to lieutenant were all white. 3 0 Twenty-two
candidates passed the captain examination. Sixteen were white, three were
black and three were Hispanic. On this exam, the pass rate for white test
takers was 64 percent, while the pass rate for black and Hispanic test takers
was 37.5 percent. Under the City rules, the nine candidates eligible for
promotion included seven white and two Hispanic firefighters.32 These
numbers presented a racially adverse impact sufficient to make out a prima
facie case of disparate impact under Title VII. 3 3 As soon as the exam
results were made publicly available,
[s]ome firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the
results showed the test to be discriminatory. They threatened a
discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the tests.
Other firefighters said the exams were neutral and fair. And they, in turn,
threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City did not certify the
results. 34

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 2665 (2009); see also id. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2666.
Id. at 2665.
Id.

28. Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 2678.
Id. at 2665.
Id. at 2678.
Id. at 2665.
Id. at 2677; see also id. at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2664.
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In January 2004, the Civil Service Board (CSB) met to decide whether
to certify the results of the exam. At the beginning of the meeting, the
city's director of human resources informed the board that she believed
there was a "significant disparate impact" of the exams.3 5 The board heard
testimony from firefighters who supported certifying the list and from those
who opposed the certification. Over the course of five meetings, the board
heard further testimony from the person who had developed the test for the
city, from additional firefighters and New Haven community members,
from other professional test developers, from individuals employed in fire
departments in other cities, from the city's legal counsel, and from a
psychologist from Boston College.36 At the close of these meetings, the
Civil Service Board voted on whether to certify the results; one member
was recused, and the remaining four members deadlocked, two-to-two on
whether to certify. The consequence was that the list was not certified.
Following the decision not to certify the results, seventeen white and
one Hispanic firefighters filed suit, alleging violations of their
constitutional rights.3 8 At the same time, they filed charges with the
EEOC,39 and ultimately amended their complaint to include an allegation
that the CSB's decision not to certify the test results constituted race
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 4 0 The parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The city argued that the CSB's good-faith belief
that certifying the exam would expose it to liability for disparate impact
discrimination shielded it from liability for disparate treatment. Petitioners
argued that the city's good faith belief was not a valid defense to their
disparate treatment claims. The district court granted summary judgment
for the city. 4 1 The district court found that the "motivation to avoid making
promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact . .. does not, as
a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent."4 2 The Second Circuit
35. Id. at 2667.
36. Id. at 2667-71.
37. Id. at 2671.
38. Id. The Supreme Court's decision addressed only the statutory claim.
39. If there is any doubt as to whether the description of the facts in a judicial opinion matters,
consider this: In both 14 Penn Plaza and Ricci the identical administrative event occurred - the
complainants filed charges with the EEOC and the EEOC determined that it would not pursue the
matter, but that the complainants were entitled to file in federal court. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy
described this determination as "the [EEOC] issuing right-to-sue letters." Id. at 2671. In 14 Penn Plaza,
the identical event is described, again by Justice Kennedy, as follows: "[T]he EEOC issue a Dismissal
and Notice of Rights, which explained that the agency's 'review of the evidence . . . fail[ed] to indicate
that a violation ha[d] occurred' and notified each respondent of his right to sue."' 14 Penn Plaza v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1462 (2009).
40. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2671 (2009).
41. Id.
42. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006).
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affirmed the decision of the district court.
Beyond those basic facts, there is a great deal of dispute about
precisely what happened - or at least what mattered - in New Haven in the

development and administration of the test and the evaluation of whether to
certify the results. The majority opinion focused on the reliance interest of
the firefighters who took and passed the test in having the results certified,
emphasizing repeatedly the "considerable personal and financial cost"
involved in studying for and taking the test. 4 3 The majority described the
way the test was developed as a careful process that was highly solicitous
of minority firefighters and extraordinarily professional.4 4 Throughout its
description of the facts, the majority emphasized the good motives of Chad
Legel, the test developer whose test was being challenged.4 5 By contrast,
the majority dismissed the testimony of Christopher Hornick, the expert
who questioned the validity of the challenged test and suggested that better
alternative tests were available.4 6
On the basis of its version of the facts, the majority concluded that
"there is no genuine dispute that the examinations were job-related and
consistent with business necessity." 4 7 For the majority, the story - the
undisputed and indisputable story - of what happened in New Haven is
this:
The record in this litigation documents a process that, at the outset, had
the potential to produce a testing procedure that was true to the promise
of Title VII: No individual should face workplace discrimination based
on race. Respondents thought about promotion qualifications and
relevant experience in neutral ways. They were careful to ensure broad
racial participation in the design of the test itself and its administration.
As we have discussed at length, the process was open and fair. The
problem, of course, is that after the tests were completed, the raw racial
results became the predominant rationale for the City's refusal to certify
the results.48

But, while the majority may not dispute this story, the facts presented in the
record below present at least one competing version of what happened in
New Haven.
Starting with the observation that "[t]he Court's recitation of the facts
leaves out important parts of the story,"4 9 the dissenting opinion described

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See, e.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664, 2667, 2676, 2681.
See, e.g., id. at 2665-66.
See, e.g., id. at 2668, 2678-79.
See, e.g., id. at 2668-69, 2680-81.
Id. at 2678.

48. Id. at 2681.
49. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the long history of race discrimination in the New Haven fire department
and demonstrated how the record developed below could be read to suggest
a very different process for developing the challenged test than that
described by the majority. While the majority lauded the test development
process, the dissent pointed out that there was no evaluation before hiring
the test writer of what kind of test would best evaluate candidates for
promotion. "Instead, the City simply adhered to the testing regime outlined
in its two-decades-old contract with the local firefighters' union." 5 0 After
the test was administered, and the significant adverse impact became
apparent, the city referred the question to the CSB. At this point, too, the
dissenting opinion demonstrated that a very different story could be read in
the record than the majority's view that only statistical racial disparities
mattered in the Board's process. Instead, Justice Ginsburg pointed to
evidence that the CSB members understood
their principal task was to decide whether they were confident about the
reliability of the exams: Had the exams fairly measured the qualities of a
successful fire officer despite their disparate results? Might an alternative
examination process have identified the most ualified candidates
without creating such significant racial imbalances?
With those questions in mind, the CSB heard testimony from a range of
sources. The dissent's description of the testimony pulled out passages
entirely different from those relied on by the majority, pointing out that the
testimony offered by the witnesses at the CSB included varied and
sometimes inconsistent information. Justice Ginsburg concluded her initial
description of the facts with the statements made by CSB members when
they announced the decision not to certify. All of the Commissioners'
statements, whether they ended in a vote to certify the results or not,
focused on whether the evidence had demonstrated that the tests were truly
job related and were better than available alternatives.5 2
Justice Alito's concurring opinion focused on yet another story: he
saw in the record evidence that the city's process for deciding whether to
accept the test results was tainted by the political maneuvering of powerful
members of New Haven's African-American community and the
Alito
willingness of city officers to submit to that maneuvering.
concluded that
a reasonable jury could easily find that the City's real reason for
scrapping the test results was not a concern about violating the disparate50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
at 2695 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
at 2684-88 (Alito, J., concurring).
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impact provision of Title VII but a simple desire to please a politically
important racial constituency.54

With that statement he (perhaps unintentionally) acknowledged that a
"reasonable jury" might look at the facts in more than one way - thus
making summary judgment for either party inappropriate.
These three opinions tell a set of stories that demonstrate genuine
dispute as to many of the material facts in the case. There was evidence in
the record that the test was developed with care and attention to whether it
would best measure the skills needed for promotion in the New Have fire
department. And there was evidence in the record that the test was
developed without sufficient attention to that question, and that the test was
in fact not the best way to measure the relevant skill set. There was
evidence in the record that the members of the CSB made their decision
because of statistical disparity alone, and there was evidence in the record
that they made their decision because they were unconvinced that the test
satisfied business necessity. To conclude that that was "no genuine dispute
of material fact," the majority had to make multiple credibility
determinations about the expert testimony it read, as well as about the
veracity of the CSB members' own statements about their motives. Perhaps
a reasonable jury could have gone either way on these questions, but that is
precisely why the standards for summary judgment were not met in this
case.
The procedural extremism of the Ricci majority is remarkable. The
rules the Court developed to apply to the facts of the case similarly give the
impression of being straightforward, but in fact leave a great deal of
uncertainty as to their reach and likely impact. As an initial matter, the
Court seems to endorse a new kind of claim - before Ricci, an employer
seeking to comply with its obligations under Title VII's disparate impact
provisions was not engaging in "race-based discrimination." The majority,
however, began its analysis "with this premise: The City's actions would
violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid
defense." 55 This statement could be read - and is being treated by many
employment lawyers - to suggest that efforts to avoid disparate impact on
minority employees will always present white employees with a cause of
action for discriminatory disparate treatment and that employers will only
be able to avoid liability in those cases where it can satisfy Ricci's new
"strong basis in evidence" defense.
54. Id. at 2688 (Alito, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 2673.
56. Justice Ginsburg seems to have understood this to be the majority's new rule. See id. at 2700
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Employers may attempt to comply with Title VII's disparate-impact
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It could also, and I think should, be understood to depend on the
specific facts in this case. The Court strongly believed that there was no
dispute about the tests' job relatedness. In the Court's view, the only
concern motivating the city once it had seen the statistical results was to get
rid of those test results. Therefore, in the majority's view, "the City made
its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results
solely because the higher scoring candidates were white." 57 The majority
drew a line between: 1) voluntary compliance efforts that seek to avoid
disparate impact in the creation and administration of employment tests;
and 2) practices and the evaluation of test scores after the tests have been
taken. The former are not subject to the Court's new approach. Only after a
test has been taken - when the actual racial make-up of the results is known
- will an employer be at risk of disparate treatment liability.
At that point, of course, the risk may be significant. The "strong basis
in evidence" defense, which the majority imports from its case law on
affirmative action, 59 may be a hard one to meet. The Court provides no
guidance about what kind of information would be sufficient for an
employer to demonstrate that after it had administered a test and seen the
results, it had a strong basis in evidence for believing that it would be
violating disparate impact law to use the test in making employment
decisions.
In evaluating the long-term meaning of Ricci, it is important to keep in
mind the things the case does not do. It does not necessarily change
disparate impact law. Employers are still required to ensure that if their
employment practices have an adverse impact they are job related and
consistent with business necessity. The opinion does not suggest that every
time an employer complies with its obligations to avoid disparate impact, it
will face liability for disparate treatment. Indeed, Justice Kennedy writes
that "Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before
administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order
to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race., 60
Thus, an employer may still design job tests and other practices with the
provision, the Court declares, only where there is a 'strong basis in evidence' documenting the necessity
of their action.").
57. Id. at 2674; see also id. at 2664, 2675, 2677 (referring to the "race-based" nature of the
decision).
58. For an interesting discussion of how to understand the Ricci decision, see Charles A. Sullivan,
Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, Nw.
COLLOQUY, Nov. 29, 2009, <http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2009/l1/ricci-v-destefano-endof-the-line-or-just-another-turn-on-the-disparate-impact-road.html#more>.
59. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675-76.
60. Id. at 2677.
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goal of avoiding a disparate impact.6 1
But what Ricci does do is to make voluntary diversity efforts less
appealing to employers by casting a shadow of potential litigation over
these efforts. Will an employer going through a reduction in force (RIF),
for example, be sued by white employees if it seeks to ensure that the RIF
is not unduly impacting minority employees? Will employers face claims
of race discrimination if they participate in minority job fairs or other
diversity efforts? Ricci can certainly be read to suggest that any employer
action taken to increase opportunities for formerly excluded minority
employees constitutes intentional discrimination against white employees.
At base, the Ricci opinion rests on the Court majority's impatience
with claims of discrimination by racial minorities, and some Justices' view
that, in today's world, it is white employees who suffer discrimination. It is
notable that the Ricci majority's description of the facts is replete with
quotes explaining that "usually whites outperform some of the minorities
on testing"; 6 2 "[n]ormally whites outperform ethnic minorities on the
majority of standardized testing procedures;" 63 "regardless of what kind of
written test we give in this country .. . we can just about predict how many
people will pass who are members of under-represented groups. And your
data are not inconsistent with what predictions would say were the case." 64
Of course, this was all testimony that was in fact presented to the CSB. But
it is just a very small sample of the testimony offered during the course of
the five meetings the CSB held about these tests. For a majority of the
Justices on the Supreme Court, though, this was among the most important
information presented in the case. That fact and what it says about the
Court's view of discrimination may be what is sadly most important about
Ricci.
III. GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES

In Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Justice Clarence Thomas, writing
for a five-Justice majority, held that employees bringing age discrimination
claims are required to prove not only that age was a motivating factor in the
challenged adverse action, but that it was the "but-for" cause of that
65
action. In reaching this conclusion, the Court avoided the question on
61. Indeed, Justice Scalia concurred separately to note that the decision did not conclude that Title
VII's disparate impact provision was constitutional. That question, in his view, is one the Court will
likely address in the future. Id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., concurring).

62. Id. at 2669.
63. Id. at 2668.
64. Id. at 2669.
65. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009).
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which it had actually granted certiorari, instead reaching out to announce a
rule that will make age discrimination claims - and potentially retaliation
and disability discrimination claims - harder to prove. Moreover, the Court
overruled a twenty-year-old precedent in the process, barely
acknowledging that it was doing so.
To understand what happened in Gross, it helps to keep in mind a
basic timeline of legal development. In the 1989 decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, six Justices, in a plurality and two concurring
opinions, agreed that Title VII's prohibition on discrimination "because of'
sex meant that when a plaintiff has shown that sex (or some other protected
characteristic) was a "motivating factor" in the employment decision, the
plaintiff has shown a violation of the statute.6 6 In reaching this conclusion,
the plurality rejected the argument put forward by the employer that the
statute's prohibition on discrimination "because of' sex imposed a burden
on the plaintiff to prove that sex was the "but-for" cause of the adverse
employment action.
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret
a statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words
"because of," Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the
precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in
the employment decision she challenges. We conclude, instead, that
Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon
sex-based considerations in coming to its decision. 67
The plurality decision, Justice White's concurrence, and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence all concluded, however, that a defendant should
be able to avoid liability if the employer could show that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of the impermissible factor.6 8 Thus,
a majority of the Justices agreed that after a plaintiff demonstrated that the
impermissible factor played a role in the decision, the burden would shift to
the employer to avoid liability by showing that it would have reached the
same decision. Justice White concurred to express his view that a plaintiff
would only prevail in its initial showing if the impermissible factor was "a

66. 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
67. Id. at 241-42; see also id. at 241 ("The critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of §
703(a)(1), is whether gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made.

Moreover, since we know that the words 'because of' do not mean 'solely because of,' we also know
that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
considerations. When, therefore, an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of
making a decision, that decision was 'because of sex and the other, legitimate considerations - even if
we may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if gender had
not been taken into account.")
68. Id. at 258, 259-60, 276.
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substantial" motivating factor in the decision.6 9 Justice O'Connor agreed
with that position, and further took the view that the plaintiff should only
be entitled to the burden-shifting benefit of a mixed-motive instruction if
the plaintiff presented direct evidence of the impermissible factor.70 The
dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse, authored by Justice Kennedy,
strongly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the words "because
of' in the statute, asserting that the language required a plaintiff to prove
"but-for" causation. 7 1
At the time Price Waterhouse was decided, and before and since,
courts have interpreted identical language in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII to have the same meaning. 72 Thus,
since the ADEA, like Title VII, prohibits discrimination "because of' a
protected characteristic, courts around the country immediately began
applying the Price Waterhouse approach to age discrimination cases.73 In
cases under both statutes, courts generally applied the direct evidence
requirement suggested by Justice O'Connor's concurrence, treating that
decision as controlling because it offered the narrowest ground for the
Court's decision.74
In 1991, Congress responded to several Supreme Court decisions,
including Price Waterhouse, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA). With
regard to mixed motives, the CRA amended Title VII, but did not amend
the ADEA. The amendments on mixed motives provided that 1) a plaintiff
has proved a Title VII violation when he has shown that "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice," 7 5 and that 2) although the defendant is liable for violating Title
VII once that showing is made, the defendant may still avoid certain
damages by showing that it would have reached the same decision in the
69. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 275-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 281-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233-34 (2005) ("[W]e begin with the
premise that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes,
particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress
intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes. We have consistently applied that
presumption to language in the ADEA that was derived in haec verba from Title VII." (internal
citations and quotations omitted)).
73. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354-55 & n.5 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue unanimously have applied
Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims" and citing cases).
74. See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing:Refining the Price Waterhouse Standardand Individual
Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 873 (2004) (explaining how lower courts
analyzed Price Waterhouse and citing cases).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
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absence of the protected factor.7 6 In the wake of the CRA, a circuit split
developed as to whether Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement
should be applied when plaintiffs sought the benefit of the statutory mixedmotive structure. 7 In Desert Palace v. Costa, the Supreme Court put that
split to rest, observing that there was no statutory language suggesting a
heightened evidentiary burden, and that absent such language normal rules
of evidence would apply. 8 A plaintiff could prove that a protected
characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse action using either
circumstantial or direct evidence.79
Because the 1991 CRA did not amend the ADEA, courts after 1991
continued to apply the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives burden-shifting
framework to age discrimination cases. 80 Some courts applying the
framework continued to apply the direct evidence requirement derived
from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse."' Other
courts, particularly after the Court's decision in Costa, concluded that,
because the statute did not specify a heightened evidentiary standard, a
plaintiff was required simply to offer enough evidence - of whatever sort
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a motivating
factor.82 Jack Gross happened to live in a circuit that took the former view.
Gross worked for FBL Financial Group (FBL) for over thirty years.8 3
In 2001, he held the title "claims administration director." 8 4 In 2003, the
company reassigned Gross to a new position and transferred many of his
job responsibilities to a new position - "claims administration manager." 85
Gross received the same salary as the younger woman who was given the
claims administration manager position, but he considered the position a
demotion in light of the reallocation of his job responsibilities to a younger
employee formerly under his supervision.8 6 He filed suit against FBL,
76. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B).
77. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003) (discussing the split).
78. Id.at98-101.

79. Id. at 99-100.
80. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of CongressionalOverrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 549-50 (2009) (discussing
how courts treated Price Waterhouse after the congressional response to the case in the CRA).
81. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 536, 562 (8th Cir. 2008).
82. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Given that the
language of the relevant provision of the ADEA is similarly silent as to the heightened direct evidence
standard, and the presence of heightened pleading requirements in other statutes, we hold that direct
evidence of discrimination is not necessary to receive a mixed-motives analysis for an ADEA claim.").
83. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2347.
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alleging that the demotion violated the ADEA, which prohibits job
discrimination "because of ... age." 87 At trial, Gross produced evidence
that the decision to reassign his job responsibilities was based, at least in
part, on his age. FBL defended against the claim by asserting that the
reassignment was part of a larger corporate restructuring and that the new
job responsibilities were better suited to Gross's skills.88
At the close of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury that it
must return a verdict for Gross if it concluded that he had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that age was "a motivating factor" in the
decision.8 9 The court defined "motivating factor" to mean that "[it] played
a part or a role" in the decision. 90 The court also instructed the jury that it
should find for FBL if the employer proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision even if age had
played no role at all. 91 After the jury ruled for Gross, FBL appealed the
jury instructions. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, observing that
precedent in the circuit permitted a Price Waterhouse motivating factor (or
mixed-motives) jury instruction only when the plaintiff had presented
"direct evidence" of discrimination. Because Gross had presented no such
evidence, the court concluded, he was not entitled to the instruction. 92
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether an agediscrimination plaintiff is entitled to a mixed-motives instruction only if he
presents direct evidence that age played a role in the adverse decision. 93 In
deciding the case, the Court avoided that question entirely by deciding that
age-discrimination plaintiffs were never entitled to mixed-motive jury
instructions and that instead the burden on an age plaintiff was to
demonstrate that age was the "but-for" cause of a challenged action. 94 This
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2347-48.

§ 623(a) (2006)).

93. Id. at 2348.
94. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, dissented both from the
Court's decision to decide a question different from that on which it had granted certiorari and also
from the answers the majority gave to the question it did decide. On that question, the dissent focused
on the fact that "[t]he relevant language in the two statutes is identical and we have long recognized that
our interpretations of Title VII's language apply 'with equal force in the context of age discrimination,
for the substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII.""' Id. at 2354
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)
(quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978))). Price Waterhouse correctly decided that
prohibiting action "because of' a protected characteristic meant "that [the protected characteristic] must
be irrelevant to employment decisions," id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) and that same definition should apply to the same words in the
ADEA. Id. at 2355-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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substitution of the question presented with an entirely different one was
remarkable for a number of reasons. First, the possibility that an age
discrimination plaintiff would never be entitled to a mixed-motives
instruction was not raised at all until respondent, FBL, filed its brief on the
merits.95 Reaching out for a question of such significance raised at this late
point in the case is contrary to regular Court procedure for good reason.96
When the Court grants certiorari on a particular question presented, not
only the parties to the particular case, but other individuals and
organizations with possible interests in the matter will consider whether to
present arguments as amici curiae to assist the Court in reaching the best
decision. Those arguments should ensure that the Court is considering a
range of perspectives and positions on the issues it decides. Moreover, in
theory, when the Court considers a question, it will be one fully considered
by at least the court below and perhaps by other courts as well. 97 Here, the
question ultimately answered by Gross was not briefed by the petitioners or
any of the amici curiae supporting their position to the Court,98 and no
lower court had considered the question.
Second, while the Court's decision never explicitly overruled Price
Waterhouse, its reasoning directly contradicts the reasoning of that opinion
and it is hard to imagine what is left of Price Waterhouse after Gross. Most
significantly, the Gross majority adopted the causation standard pressed
unsuccessfully by the Price Waterhouse dissenters. This is no small change
in the law. "The specification of the standard of causation under [a statute]
is a decision about the kind of conduct that violates that statute." 99 The
Gross majority's somewhat casual, one-paragraph redefinition of what it
means for an action to be taken "because of' a protected characteristic may
well have consequences beyond the age discrimination context.
95. See, e.g., id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Ala. v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661 n.3 (2002) ("We do not entertain this contention,
for Shelton first raised it in his brief on the merits. We would normally expect notice of an intent to
make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent's opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. this
Court's Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those likely affected and wishing to
participate.") (quotation and citation omitted); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ala., 526 U.S. 160, 171 (1999)
(observing that it is the Court's "practice" not to entertain arguments about overruling precedent when
they had not been raised in the brief in opposition to the certiorari petition).
97. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 659 n.192 (2004)
(through percolation "lower courts are able to view problems in an uninhibited manner, leading to
multiple perspectives on a difficult issue"); William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role ofthe Supreme
Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1986) (describing the need for an issue to "percolate" in the lower
courts to permit full development of the issue).
98. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-441, 2009 WL 740767,
at *1-*2 (March 19, 2009); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2353 n.2 (2009) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
99. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237.
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Moreover, the majority opinion used a startling sleight of hand to
make it seem as if the causation standard expressed in the words "because
of' was an entirely open question. First, Justice Thomas noted that the
Court had never held that "this burden-shifting framework applies to
ADEA claims." 00 In fact, it was true that, although every circuit court to
consider the question had applied the Price Waterhouse framework to the
ADEA, the Supreme Court had not considered the question. 01 But Justice
Thomas's opinion then shifted the frame (and the framework) by focusing
instead on the 1991 Act's burden-shifting approach. Although neither party
had argued that the framework in 703(m) and 706(g) of Title VII - the
provisions added in 1991 - should be applied to the ADEA, that is the
question the Gross majority selected to answer. With that shift in place,
Justice Thomas reasoned, "[u]nlike Title VII, the ADEA's text does not
provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age
was simply a motivating factor." 0 2
By focusing on the language added to Title VII in 1991, the majority
in Gross made the question it answered an easy one. As the majority
explained in a footnote: "In this instance, it is the textual differences
between Title VII and the ADEA that prevent us from applying Price
Waterhouse and Desert Palace to federal age discrimination claims."1 03
And, of course, it is true that the language added in 1991 to Title VII is
different from the term "because of' employed in the ADEA. But that
comparison is not the relevant comparison when the question presented and
argued was how the burden-shifting framework established in Price
Waterhouse applies to the ADEA. In 1989, when the Court interpreted the
term "because of' in Title VII, the language of that statute was identical to
the language in the age discrimination statute. The question, therefore, was
whether the Court was going to respect its own precedent as to the meaning
of the term "because of' or whether the new members of the Court were
going to reject settled statutory interpretation in favor of a new
interpretation of the same words.
The majority in Gross chose the second option. And it chose to
replace the interpretation of the Price Waterhouse majority with that of the
Price Waterhouse dissent in a one-paragraph analysis. First, the Court
observed that several dictionaries define "because of' to mean "by reason
of' or "on account of." 04 Therefore, the Court concluded
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (emphasis added).
See id. at 2354-55 & n. 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2349.
Id. at 2349 n.2.
Id. at 2350.
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the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took
adverse action "because of' age is that age was the "reason" that the
employer decided to act. To establish a disparate treatment claim under
the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that
05
age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse decision.

This assertion cannot possibly be squared with the statement from Price
Waterhouse that "[t]o construe the words 'because of as colloquial
shorthand for 'but-for causation,' . . . is to misunderstand them." 06 And the
Court did not try to square the two cases. Instead, Gross brushes off Price
Waterhouse with the observation that "it is far from clear that the Court
would have the same approach were it to consider the question today in the
first instance." 107 It seems in fact to be no coincidence that the
interpretation of "because of' adopted in Gross was the interpretation
preferred by the dissenting Justices in 1989.108
It is hard to predict what the substantive consequences of Gross will
be for age discrimination litigants. The most obvious, of course, is that
plaintiffs currently in litigation who might have wanted to make a mixedmotive argument will not have that choice. On that issue, though, the case
may not have a long shelf-life, as several members of Congress have
already announced their intent to introduce legislation providing for a
mixed-motive age discrimination claim.1 09 More seriously, the decision
will likely make it harder for any age discrimination plaintiff to succeed in
court. 0 The "but-for" standard of causation puts a burden on the plaintiff
that will be extremely difficult to meet. Most employment decisions - most
decisions of any sort - are in fact taken for more than one reason. Proving
that any one of those reasons was the "but-for" cause of the decision
"requires the mental construction of a non-existent world - one in which
the defendant's action did not occur."',
Furthermore, in the context of
105. Id. (internal citations omitted).
106. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
107. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009); see also id. at 2532 ("[E]ven if
Price Waterhouse was doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its applications have eliminated
any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims.").
108. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Title VII liability
requires a finding of but-for causation.").
109. Democrats Move to Counter High Court on Age Discrimination, CQ POLITICS, Oct. 6, 2009,
<http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfn?doclD=cqmidday-000003217230&utmsource-twitterfeed
&utmmedium-twitter&utmcampaign-top-stories> (last viewed Nov. 23, 2009).
110. This seems particularly likely in light of the Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009), discussed infra Part V. Because Iqbal urges courts to examine complaints alleging intent
with a critical eye, and Gross sets a higher causation bar for age discrimination plaintiffs, the cases
together send a message to lower courts evaluating whether a claim should go forward that plaintiffs
have their work cut out for them.
111. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Disparate
Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L. J. 489, 515 (2006).
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discrimination litigation, the fact that the plaintiff is being asked to prove is
one that the defendant has unique access to information about: what,
precisely, motivated his actions.112
Other areas of discrimination law may also be affected by the Court's
redefinition of the causation standard implied by use of the words "because
of." When Congress amended Title VII to add § 703(m) and § 706(g), it
excluded not only age, but also retaliation and disability from the list of
claims covered by the new statutory approach. 113 As they did with the
ADEA before Gross, courts have applied the Price Waterhouse framework
to retaliation claims. 114 Title VII's prohibition on retaliation, similar to its
prohibition against discrimination based on certain protected
characteristics, forbids taking action "because" of action taken by the
plaintiff.11 5 Without some reason to do otherwise, courts will usually
interpret the same language used in two different parts of a statute the same
way. With the Court's new interpretation of the meaning of the words
"because of," defendants are likely now to argue that motivating factor and
mixed motive arguments are not available in retaliation cases. Of course,
since the Court did not specifically overrule Price Waterhouse, a plaintiff
might counter that the Gross interpretation of "because of' in the ADEA
does not change the Price Waterhouse interpretation of the words "because
of' in Title VII, so that for Title VII retaliation claims, the old rule should
still apply.
Like the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not
contain a specific mixed-motive provision. And the ADA defines
discrimination as action taken "because of' or "on the basis of' an
employee's disability. 116 Thus, the Court's decision in Gross may suggest
that a plaintiff in an ADA case must show that disability was the "but-for"
112. See id. It was on this point that Justice Breyer focused his separate dissenting opinion in
Gross. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358-59 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[T]o apply 'but-for' causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened
if the employer's thoughts and other circumstances had been different. The answer to this hypothetical
inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does the
employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a stronger
position than the employee to provide the answer. All that a plaintiff can know for certain in such a
context is that the forbidden motive did play a role in the employer's decision.")
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); see also Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment
Law (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 647-48 & n. 22 (2008) (discussing the relationship between the
1991 CRA and other statutes and noting that courts have not applied the CRA's structure to other
statutes).
114. See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001); Matima v.
Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000); Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1999); McNutt v. Bd. of Tr., 141 F.3d 706, 707-08 (7th Cir. 1998).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) ("on the basis of"); id. § (b)(1) ("because of").
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cause of a challenged employment act, and that the mixed-motives analysis
does not apply to disability claims.
The analysis in this context, however, might be complicated by the
fact that the ADA specifies that the remedies provisions under Title VII
apply to claims brought under the ADA.' 1" Part of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act's mixed motives structure - the "same-decision" limitation on
available damages - is codified within the referenced remedies
provisions.1 18 But the part of Title VII that defines an unlawful
employment practice as established when a protected characteristic was a
motivating factor in the decision is not specifically applicable to the ADA.
Some courts have held, nonetheless, that the entire 1991 Act burdenshifting framework applies to the ADA." 9 There is good reason to
conclude that these courts must be correct - even more so after Gross. It is
impossible to reconcile the tension between a definition of "because" that
requires that plaintiff to prove that disability was the "but-for" cause of an
employment action and a damages limitation that permits the employer to
show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
disability. If the plaintiff proves the first, it would not be possible for the
defendant to prove the second. Therefore, if the ADA's unconditional
directive that the remedies provisions of Title VII apply in disabilities
claims is to include § 706(g)(B), the motivating factor provision contained
in § 703(m) must apply to disability claims. Whether courts will accepts
that argument or will simply follow Gross's lead and conclude that mixedmotive claims exists only for those characteristics listed explicitly in
703(m) remains to be seen.
Whatever the consequences of Gross for age discrimination claimants
or others, the Court's willingness to skip the question presented in favor of
a late-in-the-day request to overrule long-standing precedent was a radical
choice that risks encouraging litigants in other cases to press their more
aggressive arguments through procedurally irregular approaches.
Moreover, it is hard to see how the Court in Gross did not overrule Price
Waterhouse; and yet it refused to acknowledge that it was doing so. This
silent rejection of settled law leaves confusion about the scope of the
current decision and the possibility of continued life in the older one. The
117. See id. § 12117(a). ("The powers, remedies and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4,
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies and procedures this
subchapter provides .... ).
118. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(b) (2006).
119. See, e.g., Buchanan v. San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M.
Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d
21, 25 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the First Circuit had not decided the question, but assuming
that the 1991 amendments applied to ADA cases).
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substantive outcome in Gross is not good for employment discrimination
plaintiffs. The way the Court got there is not good for the law.
IV.

14 PENN PLAZA V. PYETT

In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,1 2 0 the same majority again essentially
overruled significant precedent while steadfastly refusing to acknowledge
its departure from stare decisis principles. And again, the Court took this
approach as it cut into the core of federal antidiscrimination laws - in this
case concluding a collective bargaining agreement that provides for
mandatory arbitration of antidiscrimination claims by union members can
be enforced to deny those union members their preferred federal forum.12 1
To reach this conclusion, the Court reinterpreted its thirty-five-year old
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,1 2 2 limiting the meaning of
that case so completely that it could be ignored. The only
acknowledgement the Court gave to the stare decisis arguments presented
in the dissenting opinions was to observe in a footnote:
Because today's decision does not contradict the holding of GardnerDenver, we need not resolve the stare decisis concerns raised by the
dissenting opinions. But given the development of this Court's
arbitration jurisprudence in the intervening years, Gardner-Denver
would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling if the dissents'
broad view of its holding were correct. 123
The case arose when respondents, both members of the Service
Employees International Union 32BJ (Union), which represented
employees in the building-services industry in New York City, complained
that they had been reassigned to new positions in violation of the ADEA.1 24
The two men had been night lobby watchmen, but were reassigned as light
duty cleaners and night porters when their employer contracted to hire
licensed security guards for the building. 125 Because of the resulting loss of
income and status, respondents complained to the Union, which filed
grievances on their behalf. The grievances complained of age
discrimination, but also included other contractual claims arising out of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Union and
employer.1 26 The grievance process yielded no resolution, so the Union

120. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).

121. Id. at 1474.
122. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
123. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1469 n.8.

124. Id. at 1461-62.
125. Id. at 1462.
126. Id.
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requested arbitration of the claims. During the arbitration process, the
Union withdrew the ADEA claim; because the Union had consented to the
contract with the security company, it was unwilling to continue to pursue a
claim that the reassignments were age-discriminatory.127
Respondents filed a complaint with the EEOC and thereafter filed suit
in federal court, alleging violations of the ADEA.1 28 Their employer filed a
motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the CBA specified arbitration as
the exclusive forum for resolution of all discrimination claims, including
those arising under federal statute. The district court denied the arbitration
demand on the ground the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver
controlled, and meant that a union-negotiated contract could not waive an
individual employee's statutory right to pursue ADEA claims in federal
court.1 2 9 The Second Circuit affirmed on the same ground. The Supreme

Court reversed.
14 Penn Plaza answered a question that has been open for nearly two
decades. The majority of Courts, Congress, and most commentators
understood Gardner-Denver to stand for the principle that "a collective
bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers' rights to a judicial
forum for causes of action created by Congress."' 30 In 1991, the Court held
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. that an individual employee
could prospectively waive his right to a federal forum and agree to
compelled arbitration of an ADEA claim. 3 1 Every court of appeals that
had considered the matter, except the Fourth Circuit, had reconciled the
two cases with the conclusion that "an individual may prospectively waive
his own statutory right to a judicial forum, but his union may not
prospectively waive that right for him." 32
The 14 Penn Plaza majority agreed that there was no conflict between
the two cases, but it took a completely different path to reconciling the

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Pyett v. Penn. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91-92 (2007); see also 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S.
Ct. 1456, 1479 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting broad agreement among lower courts about the
meaning of Gardner-Denver); id. at 1481 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that "Congress has
unsurprisingly understood Gardner-Denverthe way we have repeatedly explained it and has operated
on the assumption that a CBA cannot waive employees' right to a judicial forum to enforce
antidiscrimination statutes.")
131. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
132. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also
Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1998); Penny
v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d 408, 413-14 (6th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g
Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 365 (7th Cir.
1997); but see E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Massey, 373 F.3d 530, 533 (4th Cir 2004).
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opinions. The supposed conflict, the majority asserted, was the result of an
overly broad reading of Gardner-Denver.3 3 The holding in that case was
not, as courts had been assuming for thirty-five years, that a union could
not negotiate away the individual statutory rights of its members. Instead,
the 14 Penn Plaza majority determined, all that Gardner-Denverheld was
that a collective bargaining agreement could not waive an individual's right
to pursue a statutory claim in a federal forum unless it did so explicitly.1 34
On this view of the Gardner-Denverholding, the case was inapplicable to
the facts presented in 14 Penn Plaza, since the CBA arbitration provision at
issue in this dispute did expressly include statutory discrimination claims.
Having disposed of the need to overrule Gardner-Denverin order to
reach its conclusion, the majority opinion went on to criticize at some
length what it described as the "broad dicta" of that case and its progeny.
Specifically, the Court emphasized that the skepticism about "the use of
arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights" that
was a central element of Gardner-Denver"rested on a misconceived view
of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned."' 3 5 Further, the majority
argued that Gardner-Denver"confused an agreement to arbitrate [ADEA]
claims with a prospective waiver of the substantive right." While the 14
Penn Plaza majority characterized this portion of Gardner-Denveras dicta,
and therefore not necessary to overrule, it emphasized the current Court's
strong disagreement with Gardner-Denver's treatment of a right to a
federal forum as a central part of the rights granted in federal
antidiscrimination laws. An agreement to resolve discrimination claims in
arbitration "does not waive the right to be free from workplace age
discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the
first instance."136

It is hard to assess how substantial an impact the Court's decision in
14 Penn Plaza will have. As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissenting
opinion,
the majority opinion may have little effect, for it explicitly reserves the
question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is enforceable
133. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1466.
134. Id. at 1467.
135. Id. at 1459. This was the central focus of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. He observed that
there had been no change in the relevant statutory provisions between 1974 and 2009, and that the
majority "ignore[d] our earlier determination of the relevant provisions' meaning" because of its
"preference for arbitration." Id. at 1475 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "In the absence of an intervening
amendment to the relevant statutory language, we are bound by that decision. It is for Congress, rather
than this Court to reassess the policy arguments favoring arbitration and revise the relevant provisions
to reflect its views." Id. at 1476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1469.
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when the union controls access to and presentation of the employees'
claims in arbitration, which "is usually the case." 137
Viewed as a part of this Term's labor and employment decisions, the case
is significant as a further demonstration of the majority's willingness to
overrule settled law and its reluctance to acknowledge that it is doing so.
V. ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
The case from last Term that could have the most significant impact
on employment litigation was not, itself an employment case. Instead, it
was a civil rights suit in which the Court essentially rewrote the rule
governing the standards district courts should apply in evaluating a motion
to dismiss a complaint early in litigation.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a Pakistani imprisoned during a sweeping
investigation following the attacks on September 11, 2001 sued, among
others, former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller. 13 8 His complaint alleged that these men approved the
unconstitutional detention and treatment of Arab Muslim men who they
unconstitutionally designated as "of high interest."' 3 9 Specifically, he
alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to" the unconstitutional treatment of certain prisoners
"as a matter of policy, solely on account of [their] religion, race and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest"; that Ashcroft
was the "principal architect" of the policy and that Mueller was
"instrumental
in
[the
policy's]
adoption,
promulgation,
and
implementation."l 4 0
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to
qualified immunity.141 While the case was still at the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.1 4 2 In Twombly, the
Court found that the plaintiffs' antitrust complaint did not contain sufficient
"credible" or "plausible" facts to survive a motion to dismiss.1 4 3 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court's opinion sent "several, not entirely

137. Id. at 1481 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1474 ("Thus, although a substantive waiver
of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld we are not positioned to resolve in the first instance
whether the CBA allows the Union to prevent respondents from effectively vindicating their federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
138. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
139. Id. at 1943.
140. Id. at 1944.
141. Id.
142. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
143. Id. at 554.
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consistent, signals" about whether its decision marked a new reading of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 that would be applicable in all cases, or
whether its new "plausibility standard" would apply only in certain
cases.1 44 The Second Circuit considered the application of Twombly and
concluded that the case established a "flexible" standard that might require
"amplification" in some types of claims "to render the claim 'plausible,"'
but that this standard would not require Iqbal to provide any additional
facts given the claims he was making.1 45 The Second Circuit concluded
that Iqbal had pled sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss and that
he was entitled to limited discovery to "probe" the allegations.1 4 6 The
Supreme Court reversed, in a decision authored by Justice Kennedy.
The five-Justice majority explained that Twombly's interpretation of
Rule 8 - which requires "sufficient factual matter" to state a "plausible"
claim for relief - applies to all civil actions.1 47 Of particular importance for
civil rights cases alleging discrimination, the Iqbal majority emphasized the
need for factual context to support an allegation of intent.' 48 Applying this
standard, the Court concluded that Iqbal's complaint did not contain
enough "factual content" to "plausibly suggest" that Ashcroft and Mueller
adopted the challenged detention policies for the purpose of
discrimination.1 49 In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the twostep process that it suggested courts might choose to apply in evaluating
complaints.
The Court first "identif[ied] the allegations in the complaint that are
not entitled to the assumption of truth." 5 0 The opinion included in that
category allegations that Mueller and Ashcroft "knew of, condoned and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" Mr. Iqbal to terrible conditions
of confinement "as a matter of policy, solely on account of his religion,
race and/or national origin." It included the allegation that Mueller was
"instrumental" in adopting these policies and that Ashcroft was the policy's
"principal architect." All of these allegations, the Court concluded, were
"bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation
of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."' 5 ' These
144. See lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing the potential inconsistencies
in the Court's Twombly decision and noting the Court's repeated reference to the "plausibility standard"
being established by the decision).
145. Id. at 157-58.
146. Id. at 178.
147. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 1953 (2009).
148. Id. at 1952.
149. Id.

150. Id. at 1950.
151. Id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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allegations the court described as "conclusory" and therefore not entitled to
an assumption of truth in evaluation of the defendants' motion to
dismiss. 152
Next the Court turned to the remaining allegations in the complaint
those that plainly did more than state the elements of the claim. The Court
included in this category allegations that the FBI arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men, that they held those detainees under harsh
conditions of confinement, and that Mueller and Ashcroft approved this
policy. As to those allegations, the Court conceded that, "taken as true"
they would establish Iqbal's claim.15 3 However, they did not save Iqbal's
complaint because the Court concluded that "given more likely
explanations, they do not plausibly establish" the purpose he attributed to
the defendants. 154 The majority accepted these factual allegations as true,
but dodged the inference of unconstitutional conduct by observing that
there was an "obvious alternative explanation" for the arrest of Iqbal and
other Arab Muslims after the September 11 attacks.15 5 "On the facts
respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and
justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally
present in the United States and who had potential connections to those
who committed terrorist acts." 1 5 6 And the majority concluded that, as
between this "obvious" explanation for the conduct complained of and the
invidious discrimination suggested by the plaintiff, "discrimination is not a
plausible conclusion." 1 5 7
The dissenting Justices argued that the majority misapplied the
pleading rule articulated in Twombly, rejecting many of Mr. Iqbal's
allegations as "conclusory" when in fact they were not.' 5 8 The difficulty,
Justice Souter pointed out, was that the approach suggested by the Iqbal
opinion - looking at the facts one by one, eliminating those not entitled to a
presumption of truth - puts a court in the position of looking at each
assertion in isolation. 159 Allegations that may look conclusory or formulaic
when isolated from their broader context may look quite different when
viewed as part of an entire story. Moreover, it is hard to find a "principled

152. Id. see also id. at 1949 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.").
153. Id. at 1951.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1951-52.
158. Id. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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basis" for describing some claims as conclusory and others as
nonconclusory.1 60
The difficulty with applying the Iqbal approach in employment
discrimination cases can be illustrated by considering a pleading case that
the Court decided only a few years ago but did not mention in its Iqbal
decision.1 6 1 The radical shift in the Court's approach to pleading standards
becomes clear in looking at Swierkiewicz v. Sorema first as it appeared
when decided and then through the lens of Iqbal.
In Swierkiewicz, the Court held that a Title VII plaintiff was not
required to plead specific facts that established a prima facie case of
discrimination. This kind of heightened pleading standard, the Court said,
is not contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the courts
cannot create additional requirements beyond those in the Rules
themselves.1 6 2 The district court in Swierkiewicz had dismissed the
complaint because the plaintiff had not "adequately alleged circumstances
that support an inference of discrimination."' 6 3 The Supreme Court took
the view that "Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to
whether the claim will succeed on the merits. 'Indeed, it may appear on the
face of the pleadings
that a recovery is very remote and unlikely, but that is
64
test."'l
not the
While the rule the district court applied in dismissing the case was a
Second Circuit rule that framed a plaintiffs pleading requirement in terms
of the prima facie case, the practical impact of that rule is hard to
distinguish from the likely effects of the Iqbal standard. The facts alleged
in Swierkiewicz provide an interesting opportunity to contrast the two
cases. The plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated because of his age
and national origin. His allegations included his own age and national
origin (Hungarian), along with those of some of the people involved in the
events leading to his firing (many were younger and were French).1 6 5 He
alleged that he was isolated and not involved in business decisions that he
thought he should be involved with; that he listed his complaints to his
supervisor and demanded a severance; and that he was ultimately dismissed
160. Id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
162. Id. at 514-15.
163. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
164. Id. at 515 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). The language and tone of
Swierkiewicz are so different from Iqbal that it seems reasonable to assume that Iqbal largely overruled
the earlier decision. See, e.g., Joseph Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. - (forthcoming
2010) ("[A] strong argument can be made that Iqbal runs counter to (and implicitly overrules)
Swierkiewicz.")
165. Id. at 508.
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without severance. 166 The Swierkiewicz Court held that these allegations
"easily" met the pleading requirements because they put the defendant on
notice as to the nature of the suit, which was all that Rule 8 required the
plaintiff to do.1 67
The Swierkiewicz Court focused its attention on the liberality of the
pleading standard and its relationship with other parts of the Federal Rules,
particularly discovery and summary judgment. The Court emphasized that
cases should not be thrown out when discovery might flesh out claims that
were not yet fully developed in the complaint.' 68 "This simplified notice
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious
claims." 1 69 Taking a very different tack in Iqbal, the Court proclaimed that
"Rule 8 .

.

. does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed

with nothing more than conclusions."1 70 If Mr. Swierkiewicz's claim had
come before the Iqbal Court, it is difficult to imagine the Justices reaching
the conclusion they had reached seven years earlier.
Some of Mr. Swierkiewicz's allegations were simply the "recitals of
the elements of a cause of action" 1 71 - his age and national origin, his
qualification for his position, that he was terminated, and the ages and
national origins of the people he claimed were less qualified and were
given positions he should have received.1 72 Others can certainly be
characterized as "conclusory": the allegations that he was "isolated," that
he was "excluded," that he "was denied the opportunity to reach his true
potential." 73 Nowhere in his complaint did Swierkiewicz provide the
"factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest [the employer's]
discriminatory state of mind," 174 unless the judge reading the complaint
was willing to read into these fairly limited facts the possibility that a
French employer will prefer French employees to a Hungarian employee,
or that a younger supervisor might prefer a younger cohort. While I doubt
that the Iqbal Justices would see a plausible claim of discrimination in Mr.
Swierkiewicz's story, some judges might. The significance of Iqbal for
employment discrimination may well depend on exactly that.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 509.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 511-12.
Id. at 512.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
Id. at 1949.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 508-09 (2002).
Id. at 509.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
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Even before Iqbal made it clear that the Twombly standard would
apply to all civil actions, lower courts were confronting arguments that
Twombly should apply in evaluation of employment discrimination
complaints. 1 75 After Iqbal, it seems reasonable to assume that defendants
will file motions to dismiss as a matter of course in employment
discrimination litigation. The question then will be, what will the lower
courts do with Iqbal's statements about the standards for pleading intent?
Iqbal asks district court judges to review motions to dismiss with an
eye for whether the allegations contained in the complaint are reasonable in
light of alternative explanations for the events described. "Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . .. be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." 7 6 The risk of applying this standard in
employment discrimination litigation is that it will bring to the fore the
experiences and assumptions ("common sense") of the reviewing judge
about whether discrimination is a continuing problem in the workplace as a
general matter.
The debate over the nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor centered,
at least in public discussion, on whether a judge's personal experiences did
or should influence her perspective on the cases before her.1 77 The reality is
that they do. As the Iqbal majority recognized, "experience" and "common
sense" will play a role in judicial assessment of whether a claim is
"plausible."17 8 The available research about the views of the federal
judiciary as to the likelihood that discrimination is a plausible explanation
for employer action offers little comfort for plaintiffs. A number of
scholars have observed that courts often presume that personal animosity,
rather than discriminatory animus, influenced an employer's decision to
take a particular adverse action.1 7 9 As well, after the early days of federal
175. See Joseph Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment DiscriminationCases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014; Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much
Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly on (12)(b)(6) Motions, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) ("The rate of dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked in the
four months since Twombly.").
176. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
177. E.g., Adam Liptak, Path to Court: Speak Capably but Say Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at
Al; James Oliphant & David G. Savage, Sotomayor Gets Highest Rating: American Bar Assn. Ranks
her as "Well Qualified"for the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at A13; Charlie Savage, A
Judge's View ofJudgingIs on the Record, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A21.
178. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
179. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of CircumstantialProofin Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality"Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 215-29 (1997); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the PersonalAnimosity
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1177, 1180-82
(2003).
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anti-discrimination law, empirical research has shown that courts generally
became more receptive to the so-called "lack of interest" defense, which
poses the plaintiffs' lack of interest in a particular job or job level as a
better explanation than discrimination for job segregation.18 0 All of these
phenomena are part of a larger picture: the federal judiciary, on average,
does not believe that discrimination is a persistent problem. Faced, then,
with an "obvious alternative explanation" for an adverse employment
action, many judges may simply not view allegations of discriminatory
intent as "plausible."
The new rule created by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal
puts tremendous discretion in the hands of district courts - arguably,
indeed, puts pressure on the courts - to filter cases involving intent out of
the litigation system at the early motion-to-dismiss stage. And, as in Gross,
Ricci and 14 Penn Plaza, the Court's five-justice majority arrived at its
conclusion by disregarding procedural constraints on its ability to change
the law - in this instance the institutional responsibility for modifying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has in the past
recognized that courts are not free to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with the addition of hurdles not contained in the text.' 8
In
Iqbal, the Court ignores its own admonitions, expanding Rule 8's "short
and plain statement" requirement well beyond the boundaries of what the
text off the rule demands.
VI. CONCLUSION

In addition to sharing a procedural radicalism that deserves greater
public scrutiny, the Court's 2008-09 cases share the common thread of a
particular attitude about employment discrimination. For the Roberts'
Court majority, employment discrimination is not a problem - or, at the
least, employment discrimination litigation is a larger problem. This Court
looks at an employer trying to ensure that its tests do not unduly burden
minority employees and sees that employer trying to hurt its white
employees. This vision is a very different one from that of the Supreme
Court that decided Griggs v. Duke Power Companyl8 2 and recognized that
employers who ignore the unnecessary burdens placed on minorities are a
central part of the problem of inequality. This Court looks at the claims of

180. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice: An EmpiricalStudy
of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1073, 1081-82 (1992).
181. See, e.g. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513-515 (2002).
182. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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plaintiffs alleging discrimination and seeking access to discovery to prove
their claims and concludes that courts will be able to ascertain without any
discovery at all whether discrimination is more likely than the host of other
possible explanations for adverse action. This approach is inconsistent with
the structure and purposes of the Rule of Civil Procedure and it ignores the
imbalance in access to information that makes discovery important in
employment litigation. This Court believes that an elderly employee who is
terminated should have to prove not simply that age played a role in her
employer's decision, but that age was the reason for the decision. This
perspective is not only impossible to square with the Court's own
precedent, it also makes proving discrimination a Sisyphean task. This
Court believes that the substantive right provided in a federal employment
discrimination statute is separable entirely from the plaintiffs' right of
access to the federal courts to protect that right. All of these decisions rest
on the assumption that discrimination is less of a problem than
discrimination plaintiffs and that the laws should be interpreted to decrease
or eliminate entirely the burden that discrimination litigation imposes on
the courts.

